Effect of Family Management and Control on Value of Listed Consumer Goods Companies in Nigeria

Abstract

The dominance of family ownership and control in consumer goods companies in Nigeria continues to attract scholarly and investor interest due to its potential implications for firm value, particularly in an emerging market characterized by institutional weaknesses and volatile economic conditions. Motivated by the need to provide sector-specific and market-based evidence, this study examines the effect of family concentration, involvement, and control on the value of listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria. The objective of the study is to assess how family ownership concentration, family board control, and family executive involvement influence firm value, while addressing persistent problems of agency conflicts, managerial entrenchment, weak investor confidence, and inconclusive empirical findings in the Nigerian context. An ex post facto research design was adopted, with a population of 
21 listed consumer goods companies on the Nigerian Exchange, from which 20 firms were selected using purposive sampling based on data availability and observable family participation. Secondary data were sourced from audited annual reports and financial statements covering the period 2014–2023. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and robust panel regression techniques to address potential violations of classical regression assumptions and firm-specific 
heterogeneity. The findings reveal that family ownership concentration exerts a significant negative effect on firm value, while family board control and family executive involvement both have positive and significant influences on firm value. The study concludes that balanced and well-structured family involvement, particularly through board control and executive participation, plays a crucial role in enhancing firm 
value in listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria. Based on these results, the study recommends that family-controlled consumer goods firms limit excessive ownership concentration while strengthening effective board participation and professional family involvement at the executive level, and that regulators strengthen governance frameworks to enhance transparency and protect investor interests. 

Keywords: family ownership, family management, board control, firm value