Managerial Ownership and Value of Listed Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria

Authors

  • Moses Christopher Kanwai Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management Sciences, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna Author
  • Marvis Irom Irom Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management Sciences, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna Author
  • Latifat Abdulsalam Abdulfatah Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management Sciences, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna Author

Abstract

This study examined the effect of managerial ownership on the value of listed deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria from 2014 to 2023. Firm value was measured by share price, while managerial ownership was measured by the total ordinary shares owned by managers and directors within the company, divided by total equity shares in the company. 
Using a panel dataset sourced from the annual reports of the 12 out of 14 listed DMBs on the Nigerian Exchange (NGX), this study employed a fixed effects regression model. The findings revealed a significant negative effect of managerial ownership on firm value. This supports the entrenchment hypothesis, which suggests that excessive managerial 
ownership can reduce accountability and lead to self-serving behavior, ultimately diminishing firm value. Based on the findings, the study recommended that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) establish optimal ownership thresholds to prevent managerial entrenchment.  

Keywords:  banks, managerial ownership, ownership structure, firm value, Nigeria 

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Published

2026-03-26

Issue

Vol. 11 No. 1 (2026): June 2026

Section

Articles